Monotheistic faith must be sharply contrasted with all other, lesser types of faith. This is no modern invention. It follows from what emerged as the biblical identification of the one, unrivaled God. (“I am the One Who Is,” or “I am the One Who Originates” Exodus 6:2 [see 3:14-15]. “All things are from God and through God and into God” Romans 11:36 [see 1 Corinthians 8:6].)
Monotheistic faith is trustfully experiencing one’s very existence as constantly, intimately and wholesomely involved with no less than the unique beginning, way and end of all things, i.e., existence as such,* Being, God. (Genesis 15:6: “Abraham was constantly, intimately and wholesomely involved with the-One-Who-Is.” “Was constantly, intimately and wholesomely involved with” is a more apt rendition of the Hebrew he’emin, often translated for brevity’s sake as “believed.” The relationship is primary, belief merely a reflection.)
Even though the unique beginning, way and end of all things cannot possibly be another person like you and me, monotheistic faith finds it necessary to use personal and interpersonal analogies (many call these symbols or metaphors) because of the apparent constancy, intimacy and wholesomeness of its involvement. (After all, I am constantly, intimately and more or less wholesomely involved with myself, though I don’t experience myself as the unique beginning, way and end of all things.) These are analogies, not literal descriptions. But they and other analogies are no more optional or fictitious than the involvement itself.
This is not belief without evidence or belief despite contrary evidence. Experiencing one’s very existence in this way is all the evidence needed or possible for trusting that this is indeed what existence as such involves. That is the meaning of faith in Hebrews 11:1—the experience itself (faith) is, to translate more carefully, “the very being (hypostasis) of what is envisioned, the interruption (elegchos) from what can’t be observed” (because existence as such, Being, is not a discrete object of perception but the ever-present reality from and through and into which even perception happens). The experience can’t be evidence for anything less than existence as such, but for that, and that alone, it suffices.
It’s still faith, however, not settled knowledge, because the experience is interruptive, it is not universally acknowledged or trusted (it could always be dismissed as an illusion), and even the language used to speak of it can be controversial. Monotheistic faith presumes that the experience, though disconcerting, is not an illusion, and that those who do acknowledge it in monotheistic terms are are numerous and trustworthy enough to justify trusting the experience itself, even in the face of disagreement.
Monotheistic faith has nothing to say about anything less than the unique beginning, way and end of all things. Anything less is not the one, unrivaled God experienced in this way. People may speak of provisional faith in lesser things, but this is less than monotheistic faith, and monotheistic faith has nothing directly to say about any provisional faith.
Monotheistic faith can’t tell us if certain stories about the past are factually accurate. It can tell us if those stories illuminate experiencing one’s very existence as constantly, intimately and wholesomely involved with no less than the unique beginning, way and end of all things. But stories can do that without being factually accurate. People can have preferences here (provisional faith), but these are not supported or refuted by monotheistic faith.
The same goes for any writings treated as sacred. Monotheistic faith can tell us if certain writings illuminate experiencing one’s very existence as constantly, intimately and wholesomely involved with no less than the unique beginning, way and end of all things. It cannot tell us if those writings are accurate about lesser matters, nor can it tell us if these are the only writings that do this. People can again have preferences here (provisional faith), but these are not supported or refuted by monotheistic faith.
Monotheistic faith can’t tell us if theories about how lesser things work in the present are better or worse than others, as long as they are about lesser things. It can tell us if any of these theories illuminate experiencing one’s very existence as constantly, intimately and wholesomely involved with no less than the unique beginning, way and end of all things. People can again have preferences here (provisional faith), and reputable commentators on scientific method argue that preferences can be helpful sometimes, but once again these are not supported or refuted by monotheistic faith.
Of course, if a theory about lesser things is used to deny or to confirm the actuality of constant, intimate, wholesome involvement with no less than the unique beginning, way and end of all things, monotheistic faith will object that a category mistake has occurred—the theorist has ventured beyond her or his area of expertise. Because physics, chemistry, biology and neuroscience are theories about lesser things, they cannot directly deny or confirm a more basic world view (or “ontology”) about existence as such, though their practitioners can forget this.
Monotheistic faith has everything to say about the unique beginning, way and end of all things, precisely because it is experiencing one’s very existence, existence as such, as constantly, intimately and wholesomely involved with this. And it has every reason to prefer world views (or “ontologies”) that make its involvement look trustworthy, because world views (e.g., physicalism, determinism, reductionism, holism, panpsychism, neutral monism, process thought) are not about lesser things but about existence as such. Ontologies are too basic to be decisively confirmed or refuted scientifically, but there are still reasons and evidence for preferring some world views over others. I prefer process thought, for example, not only because it makes the involvement articulated by monotheistic faith look more trustworthy, but also because it seems more coherently to explain everything that physicalism, determinism, and reductionism try to explain, and it best reflects the flow of experience in all its facets. (In practice, everybody lives by some world view or other, some set of ontological categories too basic to be tested by observations. Philosophers and theologians are the only professionals who devote full attention to this.)
—Fr. Charles
*Many philosophers and theologians prefer to restrict the word “existence” to lesser things than God, preferring to say that God is, but not that God exists. This is understandable, but still a departure from common usage that often leads to confusion. Process theists don’t observe that restriction. There is nothing necessarily restrictive in saying that God exists. God’s existence is unlike the existence of anything from, through and into God, but it can still be called existence.
